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Abstract—The world-changing blockchain technique provides
a novel method to establish a secure, trusted and decentralized
system for solving the security and personal privacy problems
in Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) applications. The mining
process in blockchain requires miners to solve a proof-of-work
puzzle, which requires high computational power. However,
the lightweight IIoT devices cannot directly participate in the
mining process due to the limitation of power and computational
resources. The edge computing service makes it possible for IIoT
applications to build a blockchain network, in which IIoT devices
purchase computational resources from edge servers and thus can
offload their computational tasks. The amount of computational
resource purchased by IIoT devices depends on how many profits
they can get in the mining process, and will directly affect the
security of the blockchain network. In this paper, we investigate
the incentive mechanism for the blockchain platform to attract
IIoT devices to purchase more computational power from edge
servers to participate in the mining process, thereby building
a more secure blockchain network. We model the interaction
between the blockchain platform and IIoT devices as a two-
stage Stackelberg game, where the blockchain platform act as the
leader, and IIoT devices act as followers. We analyze the existence
and uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium, and propose an
efficient algorithm to compute the Stackelberg equilibrium point.
Furthermore, we evaluate the performance of our algorithm
through extensive simulations, and analyze the strategies of
blockchain platform and IIoT devices under different situations.
Index Terms—Industrial internet of things, blockchain, cloud
mining, incentive mechanism, Stackelberg game.
I. INTRODUCTION
CURRENTLY, Internet of Things (IoT) has attracted moreand more attention in many areas, such as smart cities,
agricultures, health care, industry, etc. It is estimated that the
total number of connected IoT devices will be 50 billion by
the end of 2020 [1]. Specifically, the widespread application
of the IoT has stimulated the evolution of factories to the
fourth industrial revolution (Industry 4.0) [2]. Industrial IoT
(IIoT) provides interconnection to smart factories by connect-
ing different types of industrial machines and devices, which
helps to realize the intelligent manufacturing. To deal with
the huge number of IIoT devices, a traditional centralized
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architecture is applied to provide services for IIoT devices,
where IIoT devices are connected to a cloud server through the
internet. With the rapid growth of the number of IIoT devices
and the performance requirement of the IIoT applications,
however, the traditional centralized IIoT architecture faces
many challenges, such as security, personal privacy, bandwidth
constraint, and service delay [3]. To avoid these issues, some
works introduce decentralized peer-to-peer (P2P) architectures
for IIoT applications [4]–[6], where each device can exchange
information or trade directly with other devices without a
third-party organization. However, these P2P architectures still
face with security and personal privacy issues.
In the past few years, blockchain, as a world-changing
technology, has shown its excellent properties in many fields
[7]–[10]. Blockchain is a decentralized public ledger that
stores data in a list of blocks, these blocks are linked using
cryptography, each block stores the hash value of the previous
block. No centralized server is required for maintaining the
blockchain, instead, all the blocks are copied and shared
by each user in the blockchain network, and the blockchain
is maintained by multiple participants in the P2P network.
Blockchain provides a novel technology that helps establish
a secure, trusted and decentralized system for solving the
security and personal privacy problems in IIoT applications.
To generate a new block, the participants (miners) of the
blockchain need to solve a proof-of-work (PoW) puzzle [11],
which is hard to be solved but easy to be validated. The one
who first solve the puzzle has the right to packet a new block
(the process is called mining), and will get a reward from the
platform. Nevertheless, the lightweight IIoT devices cannot
directly participate in the mining process due to the huge
computational resources requirement.
The edge computing architecture makes it possible for IIoT
applications to establish a blockchain network, where IIoT
devices can offload the computational tasks to edge servers
[12]–[14]. Specifically, incentivized by the reward from the
platform for packeting a new block, each IIoT device will
purchase a certain amount of computational resources (such
as CPU and GPU) from edge servers to participate in the
mining process for maximizing its own profit. Some existing
works [15], [16] study the pricing problem between resource
provider (edge server) and miners (IIoT devices), i.e., the
resource provider offer a price to maximize its own profit,
and miners decide their demand for computational resource
to maximize their payoffs. However, these works didn’t pay
attention to the safety of the blockchain network. Generally,
the blockchain platform will dynamically adjust the threshold
value of the hash puzzle to stabilize the generating speed of
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the new blocks. That is, if the total computational power of all
miners is small, the platform will give a large hash threshold
value, otherwise, it will give a small hash threshold value. The
total computational power of all miners will directly affect the
safety of the blockchain network. An attacker who wants to
tamper with the context in a block of the blockchain needs to
solve the hash puzzle faster than the current whole network.
Thus it’s more harder for the attacker to change the context
of blocks if all miners provide more computational power in
the mining process.
In this paper, therefore, we study the incentive mecha-
nism of the blockchain platform to motivate IIoT devices to
purchase more computational resources to participate in the
mining process, thus that a more secure blockchain network
can be established for IIoT. The main contributions of this
paper are listed as follows.
• We design an incentive mechanism for the IIoT
blockchain platform where the blockchain platform pro-
vides a certain reward to participating IIoT devices, to at-
tract IIoT devices to purchase more computational power
from edge servers to participate in the mining process,
thereby building a more secure blockchain network.
• We analyze the relationship between the security of the
blockchain network and the total computational power
of the entire network, and give the probability that an
attacker can successfully tamper with the blockchain.
• We formulate the interaction between blockchain plat-
form and miners as a two-stage Stackelberg game. We
analyze the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg
equilibrium, and propose an efficient algorithm to com-
pute the Stackelberg equilibrium point.
• We conduct extensive simulations to evaluate the perfor-
mance of our proposed algorithm, and we analyze the
strategies of platform and miners in different situations.
Our work is helpful for the IIoT blockchain platform
to set a reasonable reward pricing strategy to maximize
its utility, which is closely related to the security of the
blockchain network.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In
Section II, we introduce the related works of this paper. In
Section III, we describe the system model and analyze the
blockchain security that motivated our problem, and then we
formulate our problem as a two-stage Stackelberg game. In
Section IV, we analyze the existence and uniqueness of the
Stackelberg equilibrium, and give the best strategies for miners
and blockchain platform. We conduct extensive performance
evaluations in Section V. And finally, we conclude this paper
in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORKS
Recently, there are numerous works concentrate on the IoT
blockchain networks. Huang et al. [17] build a redactable
consortium blockchain based on the first threshold chameleon
hash and accountable and sanitizable chameleon signature
schemes, which is efficient for lightweight IIoT devices to
operate. Fu et al. [18] propose an integrated architecture of
cooperative computing to support the demand of computing
P2P blockchain network
Trading
Ledger Ledger
Ledger Ledger
Ledger Ledger
Fig. 1. The P2P blockchain network structure [27].
power in IoT blockchain networks, their goal is to maxi-
mize the system energy efficiency. Xu et al. [19] propose a
blockchain-enabled computation offloading method to ensure
data integrity for IoT in mobile edge computing. To overcome
the huge operational overhead in energy trading market in the
industrial IoT, which is resulted by the frequent transactions,
Hou et al. [20] investigate the local electricity storage for the
blockchain-based energy trading in the IIoT. Their solutions
can achieve a good tradeoff between credit utility and oper-
ational overhead. The authors in [21] integrate technologies
such as service-oriented architecture, public key infrastructure
and enablers for Service Selection with blockchain technol-
ogy, and propose a new blockchain-based architecture for
service interoperation in IoT, which ensures data validity
and guarantees the trust of quality of service attributes for
service selection. Xu et al. [22] propose a blockchain-based
fair nonrepudiation network computing service provisioning
scheme for IIoT, in which the blockchain is used as a service
publication proxy and an evidence recorder. Their solutions
overcome the drawbacks of traditional IIoT systems, where
malicious services or clients may cheat others due to their
own interests.
Moreover, there are a series of works study the blockchain
from the aspect of auction or game theory. Yao et al. [16]
model the resource management and pricing problem as a
Stackelberg game, and they design a multiagent reinforce-
ment learning algorithm to search the near-optimal policy.
Li et al. [23] propose a secure energy trading system for
industrial IoT, in which they use Stackelberg game theory
design an optimal pricing strategy scheme for energy-coin
loans to maximize the profits of credit banks. Jiao et al.
[24] propose an auction-based market model for the trading
between the cloud computing service provider and miners.
Their purpose is to efficiently allocate computing resources
to maximize the social welfare. Wang et al. [25] propose a
blockchain and double auction mechanism-based decentralized
electricity transaction mode for microgrids, to achieve secure
and quick electricity transactions. Xiong et al. [26] formulate
the interaction between the cloud providers and miners as a
Stackelberg game, and apply backward induction to analyze
the equilibria in each sub-game.
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Fig. 2. The architecture of edge computing [28].
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first introduce the edge computing system
of the IIoT about blockchain network, we then analyze the se-
curity of the blockchain network, and finally, we formulate the
incentive problem between blockchain platform and miners.
A. System Model
In the blockchain network, the core problem is to achieve
distributed consensus. Satoshi Nakamoto proposed the PoW
consensus protocol in 2008 which is used for Bitcoin [11].
In the PoW consensus, the users who want generate a new
block need to solve a hash puzzle, which is very costly to be
addressed but easy for others to verify. This process is called
mining, and these users are termed as miners. These miners
compete with each other to solve a hash puzzle, the one who
first solve the hash puzzle has the right to generate a new
block and will get a reward from the blockchain platform.
For the IIoT blockchain network, the lightweight IIoT de-
vices cannot directly participate the mining process due to the
limited computational capability. Incentivized by the reward
from the blockchain platform, IIoT devices will purchase
computation resource from edge servers, each edge server
offers its own unit price for computational resource. As shown
in Fig. 1, the blockchain network is maintained by all of
the IIoT devices. As for the mining process, each miner will
offload its computational task to the edge server to compete
with others, as shown in Fig. 2. The probability of each
miner winning the competition depends on the amount of
computational resource it purchased. All the miners purchase
computational resource with the goal of maximizing their own
profits.
B. Blockchain Security
Blockchain is a list of blocks that are linked by block
hash value, each block record a set of transactions. More
specifically, a block contains two parts: block content and
block header. The block content is the details of transactions
information, which records all the inputs and outputs of each
transaction. The block header consists of the previous block
Attacker
Genesis Block Genesis Block
Blockchain at t1 Blockchain at t2
Fig. 3. Attackers tamper with the blockchain by winning the block mining
race.
hash value, which is used as a cryptographic link that creates
the chain, a version number that used for tracking for software
or protocol updates, a timestamp that records the time at
which the block is generated, a Merkle tree root of all the
transactions, a hash threshold value that records the current
mining difficulty, and a nonce, which is used for solving the
PoW puzzle.
The blockchain starts with a genesis block which is given
by the blockchain platform, all subsequent blocks will put
some previously generated block’s hash value into their block
header. Miners compete with each other to solve a hash puzzle,
the one who first solve the puzzle has the right to generate a
new block, and new blocks will be added behind the genesis
block. Forks may happen when multiple miners solve the hash
puzzle at the same time, thus each user maintains the blocks in
the form of a block tree [29]. According to the longest chain
principle [11], each user will choose the longest branch in the
block tree as the current blockchain, as shown in the left part
of Fig. 3.
For a blockchain miner, to get the right to attach a new block
to the chain, it needs to solve a hash function (PoW puzzle),
that is, it needs to find a nonce and record it in the block header
such that the hash value of the block header is less than the
hash threshold. As the hash function has no back door, the only
way to find such a nonce is to run many hash operations. The
difficulty of the PoW puzzle is determined by the given hash
threshold value, which is a 256-bit binary number that starts
with a certain number of consecutive zeros (difficulty). For
example, if the hash threshold starts with 60 consecutive zeros,
the probability of finding the correct nonce by performing a
hash operation is 2−60, which means that it takes an average of
260 hash operations to solve the PoW puzzle. To stabilize the
growth rate of the blockchain, the platform will dynamically
adjust the difficulty of the PoW puzzle based on the total
computational power of the whole blockchain network. Take
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Fig. 4. The probability that an attacker will ever win the race from 4 blocks
behind.
the bitcoin blockchain as an example, the difficulty of PoW
puzzle will be updated every 2 weeks to ensure that it takes
10 minutes (on average) to add a new block to the blockchain
[30].
Assume that an attacker wants to tamper with the context of
a block, the change of the context will change the hash value
of the block, so the attacker needs to find a new nonce to
solve the PoW puzzle of this block. Moreover, as each block
contains the hash value of the previous block, the change of
a block context will change all the subsequent blocks, so the
attacker should find the nonce for every subsequent block. In
fact, the attacker needs to fork a new branch, and start a block
mining race against other miners of the network. The attacker
successfully tamper with the blockchain once the attacker wins
the race, as the new branch forked by the attacker becomes
the longest one in the block tree. As shown in Fig. 3.
Now we analyze the probability of success of an attacker.
Assume that the total computational power of the blockchain
network is H by the hash rate, and the attacker’s computation
power is h. Then the probability an honest miner finds the
next block can be denoted by p = H−hH , and the probability
that the attacker finds the next block is q = hH . According to
[31], the probability that the attacker will ever win the race
from z blocks behind can be calculated by
P (z) =
{
1, if q ≥ 12 ,
I4pq
(
z, 12
)
, otherwise,
(1)
where Ix(u, v) is the regularized incomplete beta function:
Ix(u, v) =
Γ(u+ v)
Γ(u)Γ(v)
∫ x
0
tu−1(1− t)v−1 dt, (2)
and Γ(·) is the gamma function.
Consider that an attacker’s computational power is h =
1 TH/s, and he wants to tamper with the context of the 4th
block from the blockchain tip. Fig. 4 shows the probability of
success of the attacker against the total computational power
of the network. It can be seen that as the total computational
power of the network increases, the probability that the at-
tacker successfully tamper with the blockchain significantly
decreases. Specifically, when H = 10 TH/s, P (4) = 0.387%;
when H = 20 TH/s, P (4) = 0.033%. The probability of
success of the attacker reduced by more than 10 times if we
double the computational power of the entire network. The
result suggests that the larger the computational power of the
whole blockchain network, the harder it is for the attacker
to tamper with the blockchain, and thus the more secure the
blockchain network will be.
C. Problem Description
As described before, the blockchain platform provides cer-
tain rewards to incentivize miners to participate in the mining
process, and each miner purchase computational resource from
its nearby edge server for getting more profits.
For the blockchain platform, the revenue is mainly derived
from the transaction fees, assume that the average transaction
fees in a block is B. The platform will give a reward R to the
miner who packaging a new block. Note that the reward R
should be no larger than B, otherwise the blockchain cannot
maintain perpetual operation. As discussed in Section III-B,
the total computational power will significantly affect the
blockchain security, so the blockchain platform will get benefit
from the huge computational power provided by the miners.
As shown in Fig .4, the decrease speed of the probability
that an attacker successfully tamper with the blockchain slows
down as the total computational power of the entire network
increases. Thus we use the sigmoid function to describe the
benefits of the total computational power of the entire network.
We define the utility of the blockchain platform as
U = α ·
[
σ
(
β ·
∑
si∈S
µi
)
− 1
2
]
−R, (3)
where S is the miners set, µi is the computational power
provided by the i-th miner, σ(·) is the sigmoid function that
defined as σ(x) = 11+e−x , α > 1 is a constant parameter
that controls the importance of the total computational power,
and 0 < β < 1 is a constant parameter that controls the
convergence rate of the sigmoid function.
For the miners, consider there are a set S of IIoT devices
that are interested in participating in the mining process, where
S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn}. Each miner si ∈ S will purchase
µi computational power from edge servers to compete with
others in pursuit of a maximum financial profit. According to
the principle of the PoW consensus protocol, the speed of a
miner for solving the hash puzzle depends on the number of
hash operations it can perform per unit of time, that is, its
computational power. Therefore, the miner who purchases the
most computational power is most likely to solve the PoW
puzzle first. We use pi to denote the probability that miner si
winning the competition among all miners in solving the PoW
puzzle, pi can be defined as
pi =
µi∑
sj∈S µj
. (4)
The unit price of the computational power purchased by
miners may be different, as they purchase computational power
from different edge servers. Assume that the unit price of the
computational power purchased by si is λi per day. We also
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 5
assume that the blockchain will generate an average of N new
blocks per day. Then the expected reward of miner si in a day
is piRN , and its cost is λiµi. We use Pi to represent the
expected profit of miner si in one day, Pi can be calculated
as follows,
Pi = piRN − λiµi. (5)
Both blockchain platform and miners will dynamically
adjust their strategies to get the maximum profit. We model
the interaction between blockchain platform and miners as a
two-stage Stackelberg game. In the upper stage, the blockchain
platform sets the reward to incentivize miners participate the
mining process. In the lower stage, miners decide the optimal
amount of computational power they purchase. We formulate
the optimization problems for the blockchain platform and
miners as follows.
We first introduce the lower stage of the game. Given the
reward R of the blockchain platform and other miners’ strate-
gies µ−i, where µ−i = {µ1, µ2, . . . , µi−1, µi+1, . . . , µn}.
The miner si decides the amount of computational power µi it
purchased to maximize its own profit. This sub-game problem
can be written as follows.
Problem 1. miners’ sub-game.
max
µi
Pi(µi|µ−i, R)
s.t. µi ≥ 0
For the upper stage of the game, the blockchain platform
will dynamically adjust the reward R to maximize its utility.
As defined in equation (3), the utility of the blockchain
platform is directly related to the strategies µ of miners, where
µ = {µ1, µ2, . . . , µn}, and the reward R. This sub-game can
be formulated as follows.
Problem 2. blockchain platform’s sub-game.
max
R
U(R,µ)
s.t. 0 ≤ R ≤ B
Problem 1 and Problem 2 together form a Stackelberg game.
The object of the game is to find a Stackelberg equilibrium
point where neither the leader (blockchain platform) nor the
followers (miners) want to change their strategies. In this
paper, the Stackelberg equilibrium can be defined as follows.
Definition 1. Let µ∗ and R∗ be the optimal strategies of
miners and blockchain platform, respectively, where µ∗ =
{µ∗1, µ∗2, . . . , µ∗n}. Then, the point (µ∗, R∗) is the Stackelberg
equilibrium point if it satisfies the following two conditions,
U(R∗,µ∗) ≥ U(R,µ∗),∀ 0 ≤ R ≤ B, (6)
and
Pi(µ
∗
i |µ∗−i, R∗) ≥ Pi(µi|µ∗−i, R∗),∀i,∀µi ≥ 0, (7)
where µ∗−i = µ
∗\{µ∗i }.
IV. GAME ANALYSIS FOR THE INCENTIVE MECHANISM
In this section, we analyze the existence and the uniqueness
of the Stackelberg equilibrium of our proposed Stackelberg
game. We first analyze the lower stage of the game, in which
we aim to find the Nash equilibrium for the miners’ sub-game.
Based on the analysis of the lower stage, we then analyze the
utility maximization of the blockchain platforms sub-game in
the upper stage.
A. Analysis of the miners’s sub-game
After the blockchain platform set the reward R for miners,
all of the miner will dynamically adjust their strategies to get
the maximum profits until reach a Nash equilibrium. In the
following, we will prove that the Nash equilibrium point exists
in the miners’ sub-game through a theorem.
Theorem 1. The Nash equilibrium point exists in the miners’
sub-game.
Proof. For the miners’ sub-game, the object function Pi(·)
is defined in [0,∞). From equation (5), we can know that
µi ≤ RNλi , otherwise, the profit of miner si will be negative.
Thus µi is continuously chosen in [0, RNλi ], which is a non-
empty, convex and compact subset of the Euclidean space.
Next, we calculate the first order and second order derivatives
of function Pi(·).
∂Pi
∂µi
= RN
∑
sj∈S µj − µi
(
∑
sj∈S µj)
2
− λi, (8)
∂2Pi
∂µ2i
=
∂(∂Pi∂µi )
∂µi
= −2RN
∑
sj∈S µj − µi
(
∑
sj∈S µj)
3
≤ 0. (9)
Therefore, Pi(·) is a strictly concave function, and we then
conclude that the Nash equilibrium point exists in the miners’
sub-game.
As Pi(·) is a strictly concave function with µi, given
the reward R of the blockchain platform and other miners’
strategies µ−i, miner si has a unique best strategy ui, and it
can be achieved when the first order derivative of Pi(·) equals
to 0, i.e.,
∂Pi
∂µi
= RN
∑
sj∈S µj − µi
(
∑
sj∈S µj)
2
− λi = 0. (10)
Solving equation (10), we have µi =
√
RN
∑
sj∈S\{si} µj
λi
−∑
sj∈S\{si}
µj . As each strategy µi for si is an nonnegative
number, the best strategy µ∗i for si is given as follows.
µ∗i =

0, if
RN∑
sj∈S\{si} µj
≤ λi,√
RN · ∑
sj∈S\{si}
µj
λi
− ∑
sj∈S\{si}
µj , otherwise
(11)
Corollary 1. Given the optimal strategies of miners µ∗ =
{µ∗1, µ∗2, . . . , µ∗n}, for any µ∗i , µ∗j ∈ µ∗, if λi ≤ λj , then µ∗i ≥
µ∗j .
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Proof. We prove this corollary by contradiction. Suppose that
there exist two miners’ strategies µ∗i , µ
∗
j ∈ µ∗, where λi ≤ λj
and µ∗j > µ
∗
i ≥ 0. As µ∗j > 0, according to equations (10)
and (11), we can easily know that ∂Pj∂µj (µ
∗
j |µ∗−j) = 0.
Similarly, If µ∗i > 0, we have
∂Pi
∂µi
(µ∗i |µ∗−i) = 0. If µ∗i =
0, according to equation (11), we have RN∑
sj∈S\{si} µj
≤ λi,
substituting it in to equation (10), we have ∂Pi∂µi (µ
∗
i |µ∗−i) ≤ 0.
In summary, we know that ∂Pi∂µi (µ
∗
i |µ∗−i) ≤ 0.
As λi ≤ λj and µ∗j > µ∗i ≥ 0, we have
∂Pj
∂µj
(µ∗j |µ∗−j) = RN
∑
sk∈S µ
∗
k − µ∗j
(
∑
sk∈S µ
∗
k)
2
− λj
< RN
∑
sk∈S µ
∗
k − µ∗i
(
∑
sk∈S µ
∗
k)
2
− λi
=
∂Pi
∂µi
(µ∗i |µ∗−i) ≤ 0,
(12)
which contradicts ∂Pj∂µj (µ
∗
j |µ∗−i) = 0. Therefore, the corollary
holds.
Sort the miners in ascending order of λi, for clarity, miners
are renumbered and still denoted by S = {s1, s2, · · · , sn}.
According to Corollary 1, we have µ1 ≥ µ2 ≥ · · · ≥ µn ≥ 0.
We assume that the the first q miners have a non-zero
strategy, i.e., µq > 0, µq+1 = 0. We let Sq = {s1, s2, . . . , sq}.
It’s obvious that
∑
sj∈S µj =
∑
sj∈Sq µj , and we have the
following corollary.
Corollary 2. Let q be the number of miners that have a non-
zero strategy in a Nash equilibrium, then we have q ≥ 2.
Proof. Firstly, it’s clear that q > 0, otherwise, according to
equation (5), any miner si who purchase computational power
with the amount in (0, RNλi ) can get more profit. Then we
consider the case that q = 1. Let s1 be the miner who has a
positive strategy, and its current best strategy is to purchase
µ1 amount of computational power. According to equation (5),
s1’s current profit is RN−λ1µ1. However, s1 can increase its
profit by continuously reducing µ1 to 0, which indicates that
miners didn’t reach a Nash equilibrium point. Therefore, the
corollary holds.
Summing up equation (10) with i = 1, 2, . . . , q, we have
RN(q − 1)∑
sj∈Sq µj
−
∑
si∈Sq
λi = 0. (13)
Thus we have ∑
sj∈Sq
µj =
RN(q − 1)∑
si∈Sq λi
. (14)
Substituting equation (14) into equation (10), we obtain
µi =
RN(q − 1)∑
sj∈Sq λj
(
1− (q − 1)λi∑
sj∈Sq λj
)
. (15)
As µq > 0, and we have proven that q ≥ 2, we then have
1− (q−1)λq∑
sj∈Sq λj
> 0, i.e., λq <
∑
sj∈Sq−1 λj
q−2 .
Algorithm 1 Calculate Nash equilibrium for miners.
1: Sort miners in ascending order of λi and renumber miners,
i.e., λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ · · · ≤ λn.
2: S′ = {s1, s2}, q = 2
3: while q < n and λq+1 <
∑
si∈S′ λi
|S′|−1 do
4: S′ ← S′ ∪ {sq+1} ;
5: q ← q + 1;
6: end while
7: for i = 1; i ≤ n; i+ + do
8: if si ∈ S′ then
9: µ∗i =
RN(q−1)∑
sj∈S′ λj
(
1− (q−1)λi∑
sj∈S′ λj
)
;
10: else
11: µ∗i = 0;
12: end if
13: end for
14: return µ∗ = {µ∗1, µ∗2, . . . , µ∗n}
Based on the above analysis, we design the following
algorithm to find the Nash equilibrium point for the miners’
sub-game.
In the following, we first prove the strategies produced by
Algorithm 1 is a Nash equilibrium for the miners’ sub-game,
then we prove that the Nash equilibrium is unique.
Theorem 2. The strategies produced by Algorithm 1 is a Nash
equilibrium for the miners’ sub-game.
Proof. For miners in S′, their strategies are calculated by
equation (15), it’s clear that these miners get the current best
strategies as the first order of Pi(·) equals to 0 for si ∈ S′. To
prove the theorem, we only need to prove that for any miner
sj ∈ S\S′, its current best strategy is 0. According to the
description of Algorithm 1, we have
λj ≥
∑
si∈S′ λi
|S′| − 1 ,∀sj ∈ S\S
′. (16)
From equation (14), we know that
∑
si∈S′ λi =
RN(|S′|−1)∑
si∈S′ µi
,
substituting it into equation (16), we obtain that RN∑
si∈S′ µi
≤
λj for any sj ∈ S\S′. As sj /∈ S′, we have
∑
si∈S′ µi =∑
si∈S\{sj} µi. Therefore,
RN∑
si∈S\{sj} µi
≤ λj for any sj ∈
S\S′. According to equation (11), we know that the current
best strategy for any miner sj ∈ S\S′ is 0. Thus the theorem
holds.
The following corollary helps us to prove the uniqueness of
the Nash equilibrium for the miners’ sub-game.
Corollary 3. Given any Nash equilibrium µne =
{µne1 , µne2 , . . . , µnen } for the miners’ sub-game, let Sh be the
set of miners with a non-zero strategy, then we have Sh = S′,
where S′ is got by Algorithm 1, and |S′| = p.
Proof. Assume that miners have been sorted in ascending
order of λi. According to Corollary 1, we know that µne1 ≥
µne2 ≥ · · · ≥ µnen ≥ 0. Suppose that Sh = {s1, s2, . . . , sh},
i.e. |Sh| = h. To prove Sh = S′, we only need to prove
that h = p. If h > p, then sp+1 ∈ Sh, from description
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of Algorithm 1, we have λp+1 ≥
∑
si∈S′ λi
|S′|−1 ≥
∑
si∈Sh λi
|Sh|−1 ,
substituting this into equation (15), we obtain that µnep+1 ≤ 0,
which contradicts sp+1 ∈ Sh. If h < p, then we have
µneh+1 = 0 and λh+1 <
∑
si∈Sh λi
|Sh|−1 , according to equation (10),
the first order derivative of Ph+1(·) with respect to µh+1 when
µh+1 = µ
ne
h+1 = 0 is
∂Ph+1
∂µh+1
(0|µne−(h+1)) = RN
∑
sj∈S µj − 0
(
∑
sj∈S µ
ne
j )
2
− λh+1
=
RN∑
sj∈S µ
ne
j
− λh+1 = RN∑
sj∈Sh µ
ne
j
− λh+1,
(17)
where µne−(h+1) = µ
ne\{µneh+1}.
According to equation (14), we have
∑
sj∈Sh µ
ne
j =
RN(h−1)∑
sj∈Sh λj
, substituting it into equation (17), we have that
∂Ph+1
∂µh+1
(0|µne−(h+1)) =
∑
sj∈Sh λj
h− 1 − λh+1. (18)
As λh+1 <
∑
si∈Sh λi
|Sh|−1 =
∑
si∈Sh λi
h−1 , we know that
∂Ph+1
∂µh+1
(0|µne−(h+1)) > 0, which implies that miner sh+1
can improve its profit by increasing its strategy µneh+1. This
contradicts that µne is an Nash equilibrium. Therefore, we
have h = p, and thus the corollary holds.
Theorem 3. The miners’ sub-game has a unique Nash equi-
librium point.
Proof. According to Corollary 3, the miners’ sub-game can
be seen as a game among miners in S′, as for any miner
si ∈ S\S′ we always have µi = 0 in a Nash equilibrium.
Therefore, we only need to prove that the sub-game of miners
in S′ has a unique Nash equilibrium point.
As the strategy of each miner in S′ is positive, and the
profit Pi(·) for any si ∈ S′ is a concave function according to
equation (9), each miner will get its best strategy when the first
order derivate of Pi(·) equals to 0. As shown in equations (13)-
(15), we get unique solutions by solving the set of functions
that the first order derivate of Pi(·) equals to 0 for each si ∈
S′. Therefore, the miners’ sub-game among miners in S′ has
a unique Nash equilibrium, and thus we can conclude that
Theorem 3 holds.
B. Analysis of the blockchain platform’s sub-game
According to the analysis in Section IV-A, for any value
of reward R given by the blockchain platform, there always
exists a unique Nash equilibrium for the miners. Therefore,
given an value of R, the blockchain platform has a unique
utility, and it can maximize its utility by setting an optimal R.
Substituting the result of Algorithm 1 into equation (3) and
combining equation (14), we have
U = α ·
[
σ
(
β ·
∑
si∈S′
µ∗i
)
− 1
2
]
−R
= α ·
[
σ
(
β · RN(q − 1)∑
si∈S′ λi
)
− 1
2
]
−R
= α ·
[
σ (βXR)− 1
2
]
−R,
(19)
where X = N(q−1)∑
si∈S′ λi
.
Theorem 4. There exists a unique Stackelberg equilibrium
(µ∗, R∗) in our proposed Stackelberg game, where µ∗ and
R∗ are optimal strategies for miners and blockchain platform.
Proof. As the definition of the blockchain platform’s sub-
game, the utility function U(·) is defined with R ∈ [0, B].
We then calculate the first order and second order derivatives
of U(·) with respect to R,
∂U
∂R
= αβXσ(βXR) (1− σ(βXR))− 1, (20)
∂2U
∂R2
= αβ2X2σ(βXR)(1− σ(βXR))(1− 2σ(βXR)).
(21)
As βXR ≥ 0, the range of the sigmoid function σ(βXR) is
[ 12 , 1), and then we have 1−σ(βXR) > 0 and 1−2σ(βXR) ≤
0. Thus ∂
2U
∂R2 ≤ 0 holds. Therefore the utility function U(·)
is strictly concave with R for R ∈ [0, B]. It means that a
unique R∗ can be found to maximize U(·). Combined with
Theorem 3, we conclude that there exists a unique Stackelberg
equilibrium in our proposed Stackelberg game.
The maximization of U(·) is achieved either at the extreme
point where the first order derivative of U(·) equals to 0,
or at the boundary of domain area (i.e., R = 0 or B). If
αβX < 4, we have ∂U∂R < 0, ∀R ∈ [0, B], then U(·) is
a decreasing function in [0, B], and the best strategy of the
blockchain platform is R∗ = 0. If αβX ≥ 4, by solving
the equation ∂U∂R = 0, we have σ(βXR) =
√
1
4 − 1αβX + 12 ,
and thus the best strategy of the blockchain platform is
R∗ = min
{
1
βX log
(
1
2+
√
1
4− 1αβX
1
2−
√
1
4− 1αβX
)
, B
}
. In summary, we
have
R∗ =

0, if αβX < 4,
min
{
1
βX log
(
1
2+
√
1
4− 1αβX
1
2−
√
1
4− 1αβX
)
, B
}
, otherwise.
(22)
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we conduct extensive simulations to evaluate
the performance of our proposed incentive mechanism for
blockchain-based internet of things.
A. Experimental settings
In our experiments, we set the basic parameters of our
problem as follows. We assume there are totally 1000 IIoT
devices that are interested in participating in the blockchain
mining process, i.e., |S| = 1000. The unit price λi of each
miner purchasing computational power from edge servers is
uniformly range from 100 to 105. For the blockchain platform
utility model, α is set to be 10000, β is set to be 0.001, and
B is set to be 2000. We assume that it takes an average of 10
minutes for the blockchain platform to generate a new block,
and thus it will generate an average of 144 new blocks per
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Fig. 6. Impact of number of IIoT devices on |S′|.
day, i.e., N is set to be 144. Unless otherwise stated, the above
parameters will be set as default settings. Each value in figures
in this section is the average of 100 runs.
B. Results and Analyses
1) Number of participating miners (|S′|): As described in
Algorithm 1, only the miners in S′ will purchase computa-
tional power to participate in the mining process, then we
study the impact of unit price of computational power and
number of IIoT devices on |S′|.
In Fig. 5, the minimum unit price of computational power is
set to be 100, and |S| is set to be 1000. The difference of unit
price represents the range of λi for each miner. For example,
when the difference of unit price is set to be 2%, then λi
is randomly chosen in [100, 102] for each miner. From Fig.
5 we can see that |S′| decreases when the difference of unit
price of computational power increases. This is because when
the difference of unit price is large, λi of each miner will
become diverse, and thus there will be more miners violate
the condition of Algorithm 1. We can also see that the effect
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Fig. 8. Impact of λi on platform utility and miners profits.
of the difference of the unit price of computational power is
very significant, even when the difference of unit price is as
small as 1%, there are only about 44.8% miners participate
the blockchain mining process.
In Fig. 6, we fix the difference of unit price of computational
power at 5%, and study how the number of IIoT devices affect
|S′|. It can be seen that the growth of |S′| does not have a
linear relationship with the number of IIoT devices. When
|S| = 500, there are about 28.5% miners participate in the
blockchain mining process, and when |S| increased to 5000,
there are only about 9% miners participate the blockchain
mining process.
2) Effect of unit price λi on utilities and strategies: We
fix the difference of the unit price of computational power at
5%, and study how λi of each miner affect the utilities and
strategies of blockchain platform and miners.
Fig. 7 shows that when the unit price of computation power
increases, the blockchain platform needs to improve the reward
to achieve maximum utility until the maximum value of the
reward is reached. And miners tend to purchase less computa-
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tional power as it will cost more money. Combining Fig. 7 and
Fig. 8, we can observe that the platform utility decreases as
the unit price of computational power increases, this is because
the platform improves the reward but the total computational
power provided by miners decreases. We can also see that
the average profit of miners has increased, although they have
to pay more money to afford unit computational power. The
reason is that miners reduce the amount of computational
power they purchased, and the platform gives more rewards
to them.
3) Effect of |S| on platform utility and miners’ profits: We
fix the range of the unit price of computational power at
[100, 105], and study the effect of |S|.
As shown in Fig. 9, no matter how many IIoT devices are
in the blockchain network, the platform always has a stable
utility. However, miners’ average profit will decrease as more
miners will participate in the mining process and intensified
the competition.
Fig. 10 shows the profits of miners s1, s50 and s100, note
that all miners have been sorted in ascending order of λi and
renumbered. We can see that the profits of miners s1 and
s50 decrease with the increases of |S|, the result is similar
to that in Fig. 9. However, for miner s100, its profit increases
when |S| increases from 500 to 1000, then slowly decreases
as |S| increases. The reason is that when |S| increases from
500 to 1000, λi of each miner becomes more tight, and then
the difference between its unit price of computational power
and that of other miners in front of it decreases. So miner
s100 become more competitive and thus can get more profits.
In detail, when |S| = 500, λ1 = 100.011, λ50 = 100.504
and λ100 = 100.992; when |S| = 1000, λ1 = 100.004,
λ50 = 100.247 and λ100 = 100.496. We can also see that the
unit price of computational power will significantly affect the
profits of miners, especially when the number of participating
miners is small. For example, when |S| = 500, the profit of
miner s1 is 2.5 times the profit of the miner s50 and 10.6
times the profit of miner s100, while the unit price of the
computational power of the miners s50 and s100 is 0.49% and
0.98% larger than that of s1, respectively.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we design an incentive mechanism for IIoT
blockchain network that can be used to motivate IIoT devices
to purchase more computational resources form edge servers to
participate in the blockchain mining process, thus that a secure
blockchain network can be estabilished. We analyze the rela-
tionship between the security of the blockchain network and
the total computational power of the entire network, and give
the probability that an attacker can successfully tamper with
the blockchain. We model the interaction between blockchain
platform and IIoT devices as a two-stage Stackelberg game,
in which the leader, i.e., the blockchain platform, first set the
value of the reward to maximize its utility, and miners act
as followers, adjust their strategies to maximize their profits.
We prove the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg
equilibrium and design an efficient algorithm to compute
the Stackelberg equilibrium point. We also conduct extensive
simulations to evaluate the performance of our designs. Our
work is helpful for the IIoT blockchain platform to set a
reasonable reward to build a secure blockchain network.
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